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2017 Drug Laws in West Virginia: The 
Wrong Prescription for the State’s Opioid 
Crisis 
Wesley A. Shumway* 
ABSTRACT 
 
The United States has been devastated by an opioid epidemic. The 
1990s, with shifting views of pain management and aggressive marketing 
of OxyContin, saw the beginning of a crisis that has taken the country by 
storm. Pain medication prescription rates skyrocketed throughout the 
United States, and as a result, addiction, overdose, and death have 
tormented the country in astonishing numbers. 
However, no state has suffered more than West Virginia. The 
Mountain State, with its struggling economy, labor-related injuries, and 
poor educational outcomes, is ground zero for such a crisis. West Virginia 
has struggled with high addiction and overdose rates. In 2017, the West 
Virginia Legislature passed a series of harsh drug laws increasing 
mandatory minimums and creating new drug felonies. These felonies are 
similar in nature to the nationwide 1980s drug laws, which created new 
felonies and, memorably, increased mandatory minimum sentences. 
This Comment analyzes the results of the 1980s drug laws and argues 
that the similar 2017 West Virginia drug laws are a step in the wrong 
direction. The harsh drug penalties of the 1980s led to mass incarceration, 
racial discrepancies, and incarceration of small-time offenders. In 
addition, the 1980s drug laws did not curtail drug supply and demand. 
This Comment recommends striking down the 2017 drug laws, and 
instead investing more in drug courts. Drug courts, with their rehabilitative 
focus, have experienced positive results nationwide and in West Virginia. 
Drug courts reduce recidivism and are more cost-effective, but nine of 
West Virginia’s counties still have no access to a drug court. In addition, 
 
*J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University, Penn State Law, 2019. I would like 
to thank my parents for the examples they set in their academic careers, and my friend, W. 
Va. Delegate John Williams, for his assistance with this Comment. I would also like to 
thank my friends at the Penn State Law Review for their edits, advice, and support 
throughout the Comment-writing process. 
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this Comment recommends that West Virginia diversify its economy to 
shift away from solely relying on extraction and mining in particular. The 
declining coal industry has hurt the economy, and West Virginians need 
to get back to work. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States has been held hostage by the opioid crisis, but no 
state has fared worse than West Virginia.1 The medical industry’s shifting 
views of pain management in the 1990s, and aggressive marketing of 
OxyContin, led to a nationwide opioid epidemic.2 As a result, states 
around the country, especially West Virginia, are struggling to combat the 
crisis.3 
West Virginia has become ground zero for the opioid crisis due to the 
state’s struggling economy, labor-related injuries, and poor educational 
 
1. See infra Section II.B.   
2. See infra Section II.A. 
3.   See infra Section II.B. 
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outcomes.4 In December 2016, West Virginia Senator Joe Manchin 
announced a statewide “War on Drugs.”5 This announcement signaled 
what would be a busy 2017 for West Virginia lawmakers, as they passed 
a series of harsh drug laws aimed at combating the opioid crisis.6 
The new West Virginia drug laws, which increase mandatory 
minimum sentences and create new drug felonies,7 are similar to the drug 
laws that arose during the War on Drugs and crack–cocaine hysteria of the 
1980s.8 This Comment analyzes the harsh 1980s drug laws and their 
negative systemic effects.9 In particular, the 1980s drug laws led to mass 
incarceration, racial discrepancies, and the imprisonment of small-time 
offenders.10 In addition, the 1980s drug laws failed in their effort to fight 
the drug trade, as recidivism rates did not improve, and drug supply and 
demand have increased.11 
Part II of this Comment outlines the modern opioid crisis in the 
United States, and discusses why West Virginia in particular has fared 
worse than other states.12 Then, Part II continues by exploring West 
Virginia’s harsh 2017 drug laws,13 and comparing these laws to those seen 
during the 1980s expansion of the War on Drugs, which resulted in 
increased mandatory minimums for drug offenders.14 Part III then analyzes 
the negative outcomes of the 1980s War on Drugs, and the harsh 
mandatory minimum sentences.15 
After analyzing alternatives to mandatory minimums and harsh drug 
laws, this Comment ultimately recommends that West Virginia strike 
down the 2017 drug laws that resemble those of the 1980s.16 Instead, West 
Virginia should boost its drug court program and seek to diversify and 
 
4.  See infra Section II.B. 
5.   Theodore Schleifer, Manchin on WV opioid abuse: ‘We need to declare a war on 
drugs’, CNN (Dec. 20, 2016, 9:02 PM), https://cnn.it/2zOuMUD. 
6.  S.B. 219, 2017 Reg. Legis. Sess. (W. Va. 2017); S.B. 220, 2017 Reg. Legis. Sess. 
(W. Va. 2017); H.B. 2083, 2017 Reg. Legis. Sess. (W. Va. 2017); H.B. 2329, 2017 Reg. 
Legis. Sess. (W. Va. 2017); H.B. 2579, 2017 Reg. Legis. Sess. (W. Va. 2017); see infra 
Section II.C.2 for a discussion of the new drug laws passed by the West Virginia 
Legislature in 2017. 
7.   See legislation cited supra note 6. 
8.  See DEBORAH J. VAGINS & JESSELYN MCCURDY, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 
CRACKS IN THE SYSTEM: TWENTY YEARS OF THE UNJUST FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE LAW 1–
2 (2006), http://bit.ly/2B0QANg (outlining the effects of the 1980s crackdown on drugs, 
mandatory minimum sentences, and the crack-cocaine hysteria). 
9.  See infra Section III.A for a discussion of the negative systemic effects of the harsh 
drug laws of the 1980s. 
10.   See infra Section III.A.  
11.   See infra Section III.A. 
12.   See infra Section II.A–.B. 
13.   See infra Section II.B. 
14.   See infra Section II.C. 
15.   See infra Section III.A. 
16.   See infra Section III.D. 
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stimulate its coal-reliant economy.17 These measures would provide a 
more lasting solution while avoiding the negative outcomes of harsh 
mandatory minimum sentences and drug crimes. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The modern opioid crisis took the United States by storm.18 States 
around the country have been dealing with high rates of overdose and 
addiction ever since the mass prescribing of OxyContin began.19 However, 
no state has been hit harder by the modern opioid crisis than West Virginia, 
where workplace injuries, a lack of economic diversity, and liberally 
prescribed pain medications have been the norm.20 
A. The Genesis of the American Opioid Crisis 
The modern opioid crisis in the United States can be traced back to 
the 1990s, beginning with the aggressive promotion of OxyContin—
extended release oxycodone used for moderate to severe pain, approved 
by the Food and Drug Administration in 1995—as well as the medical 
community’s shifting views on pain management.21 In a 1996 speech, 
James Campbell, President of the American Pain Society, dubbed pain the 
“fifth vital sign,” which kicked off a campaign to promote pain 
management.22 Other organizations followed suit, including the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, which 
produced pain management standards in 1999 that hospitals were required 
to follow.23 The Department of Veterans Affairs likewise created the “Pain 
as the 5th Vital Sign Toolkit” in 2000.24 
 
17. See infra Section III.D. 
18.   Harrison Jacobs, Here’s why the opioid epidemic is so bad in West Virginia — 
the state with the highest overdose rate in the US, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 1, 2016, 11:00 
AM), https://read.bi/28U96H4. 
19. Ameet Sarpatwari et al., The Opioid Epidemic: Fixing A Broken Pharmaceutical 
Market, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 464 (2017). 
20.  Jacobs, supra note 18 (“The current opioid epidemic has plagued the entire US. 
But it has hit one state harder than the rest — West Virginia.”). 
21. Id.; see also Sarpatwari et al., supra note 19, at 467. 
22.  See Sarpatwari et al., supra note 19, at 465. See generally Mitchell B. Max et al., 
Quality Improvement Guidelines for the Treatment of Acute Pain and Cancer Pain, 274 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 1874 (1995) (discussing new proposed guidelines for the management of 
pain). The traditional four “vital signs” are body temperature, pulse rate, respiration rate, 
and blood pressure, which are used to monitor health problems. See Vital Signs (Body 
Temperature, Pulse Rate, Respiration Rate, Blood Pressure), JOHNS HOPKINS MED. 
HEALTH LIBRARY, https://bit.ly/2GlmEQQ (last visited Dec. 9, 2018).  
23.  Sarpatwari et al., supra note 19, at 465. 
24.  Id.; see also JOINT COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., PAIN 
MANAGEMENT STANDARDS: COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS, 
UPDATE 3 (1999); DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, PAIN AS THE 5TH VITAL SIGN TOOLKIT 5 
(2000). 
 2019 2017 DRUG LAWS IN WEST VIRGINIA 563 
The promotion of OxyContin and the christening of pain as the “fifth 
vital sign” caused sales of prescription pain medication to skyrocket from 
the late 1990s to 2010.25 This drastic increase in sales of prescription pain 
medication forced states to begin cracking down on such sales in an 
attempt to control the epidemic.26 State crackdowns on pain medication 
clinics and prescriptions have reduced overall pain medication 
prescriptions, but current prescription rates are still three times higher than 
they were in 1999.27 
Purdue Pharma28 capitalized on the medical community’s new focus 
on pain management by developing OxyContin.29 Purdue Pharma 
employed aggressive tactics to promote OxyContin, including hosting 
over forty lavish conferences, using advanced marketing data analysis, 
creating lucrative bonus packages for its sales representatives, and sending 
other promotional materials to healthcare providers.30 
Indeed, Purdue Pharma used its marketing data to target doctors who 
prescribed the most opioids, and were the least discriminate prescribers, 
in an attempt to encourage more OxyContin prescriptions.31 In addition to 
more than doubling the size of its sales team, Purdue Pharma increased its 
doctor call list from between 33,400 and 44,500 doctors to about 70,500 
to 94,000 doctors.32 Further, to promote the product, Purdue Pharma’s 
sales representatives provided patients with free starter prescriptions 
lasting up to a month.33 
In addition, Purdue Pharma heavily promoted OxyContin as a viable 
option for the “non-malignant pain market,” repeatedly claiming that 
OxyContin’s risk of addiction was low.34 In fact, Purdue Pharma sales 
representatives were instructed to report that the risk of addiction was “less 
than one percent.”35 This aggressive campaign proved extremely 
 
25.  Jacobs, supra note 18. 
26.  Abby Goodnough, Opioid Prescriptions Fall After 2010 Peak, C.D.C. Report 
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2uOK9bs. 
27.  Id. 
28. Purdue Pharma L.P., founded over sixty years ago, is a privately held 
pharmaceutical company headquartered in Stamford, Connecticut. About Purdue Pharma, 
PURDUE PHARMA, http://www.purduepharma.com/about/#&panel1-46 (last visited Dec. 9, 
2018). 
29.  Sarpatwari et al., supra note 19, at 467. 
30.  Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial 
Triumph, Public Health Tragedy, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 221, 222 (2009). The number of 
sales representatives employed by Purdue Pharma more than doubled between 1996 and 
2000 to accommodate the company’s aggressive marketing tactics. Id. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. at 222–23. 
34.  Id. at 223.  
35.  Id. 
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successful.36 From 1996 to 2001, extended-release oxycodone accounted 
for $2.8 billion in sales, and, from 2008 to 2014, oxycodone sales 
generated more than $2 billion.37 
The industry’s increased marketing and promotion of pain 
management created American “pill mills”–clinics that prescribed 
exorbitant amounts of opioids.38 Addicts and dealers routinely drove from 
Appalachia to South Florida clinics in search of liberally prescribed 
oxycodone.39 As a result of marketing and liberal prescribing, American 
opioid prescriptions increased from about 76 million in 1991 to 207 
million in 2013.40 
The flood of pain medication to the market has had considerable 
effects in the United States.41 Opioid-related deaths from 2000 to 2015 
more than doubled, while instances of opioid overdose more than tripled 
during that same period.42 In fact, in 2015, opioid-related deaths alone 
were found to reduce the “average American life expectancy” by two-and-
a-half months.43 
Despite the implementation of prescription drug monitoring 
programs, which control and monitor opioid prescriptions, the damage has 
already been done.44 Opioid-dependent Americans often now resort to 
 
36.  Sarpatwari et al., supra note 19, at 467. 
37.  Id. 
38.  See generally JOHN TEMPLE, AMERICAN PAIN: HOW A YOUNG FELON AND HIS 
RING OF DOCTORS UNLEASHED AMERICA’S DEADLIEST DRUG EPIDEMIC (Lyons Press ed. 
2015) (describing the creation and operation of South Florida “pill mills,” which 
aggressively prescribed opioids to patients). Doctors at American Pain, a pain clinic in 
Broward County, Florida, routinely prescribed individuals 240 30-milligram oxycodone 
pills, plus 60 15-milligram oxycodone pills each month. Id. at 150.  
39.  Id. at 176. There were also “pill mills” in West Virginia, like Sav-Rite Pharmacy 
in the small community of Kermit, West Virginia. Jacobs, supra note 18. Sav-Rite 
Pharmacy reportedly prescribed 3.2 million dosage units of hydrocodone in 2006. Id. Also, 
over the past decade, drug companies reportedly sent 20.8 million prescription painkillers 
to two nearby pharmacies in Williamson, a West Virginia town of 2,900 people. Eric Eyre, 
Drug firms shipped 20.8M pain pills to WV town with 2,900 people, CHARLESTON 
GAZETTE–MAIL (Jan. 29, 2018), https://bit.ly/2nopkl9. 
40.  America’s Addiction to Opioids: Heroin and Prescription Drug Abuse: Hearing 
Before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, 113th Cong. 3 (2014) 
(statement of Nora D. Volkow, Dir., Nat’l Inst. on Drug Abuse), http://bit.ly/2BZoR1h. 
41.  See generally Susan Okie, A Flood of Opioids, a Rising Tide of Deaths, 363 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1981 (2010) (describing the negative effects of opioids in the United States, 
and addressing the rising death rates associated with opioid abuse). 
42.  Kyle Swenson & Travis M. Andrews, America’s opioid problem is so bad it’s 
cutting into U.S. life expectancy, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2017), https://wapo.st/2T8SAv7.  
43.   Id. 
44. Jane E. Brady et al., Prescription Drug Monitoring and Dispensing of Prescription 
Opioids, 129 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 139, 140 (2014) (“As of June 12, 2012, 50 states . . . had 
enacted laws establishing PDMPs [prescription drug management plans], and 40 states had 
operational PDMPs . . . . However, other studies found that state PDMPs had a minimal 
effect on the overall dispensing of opioids and overdose mortality.”); Nick Miroff, From 
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heroin, which can be spiked with dangerous synthetic opioids like 
fentanyl.45 The medical community’s recognition of pain as “the fifth vital 
sign,” in conjunction with Purdue Pharma’s aggressive promotion of 
OxyContin, created a nationwide crisis. 
B. West Virginia: A State in Crisis and a Legislature Using 
Outdated Methods 
The opioid crisis may have affected the United States as a whole, but 
no state has fared worse than West Virginia.46 The state’s current 
economic climate creates a perfect storm for such a crisis.47 To combat this 
crisis, the state legislature passed a series of harsh drug laws aimed at 
curbing the trafficking of drugs into the state.48 
1. West Virginia: A Struggling State Devastated by the 
Opioid Crisis 
The opioid crisis has hurt West Virginia more than any other state.49 
Due to its current state of affairs, the Mountain State is ground zero for the 
opioid crisis.50 For example, joblessness associated with the declining coal 
industry, labor-related injuries, and low education levels have all 
contributed to the meteoric rise of the state’s opioid crisis.51 
West Virginia is in the midst of a considerable economic struggle, as 
the state is currently one of the lowest-rated states for business activity and 
growth.52 West Virginia was also one of only seven states whose economy 
contracted in 2016, with a gross domestic product loss of 0.9%.53 West 
 
Teddy Roosevelt to Trump: How drug companies triggered an opioid crisis a century ago, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2017), https://wapo.st/2RQu0h3. 
45.  See Miroff, supra note 44; Brady et al., supra note 44, at 140. Fentanyl is “a 
powerful synthetic opioid analgesic that is similar to morphine but is 50 to 100 times more 
potent.” What is fentanyl?, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, http://bit.ly/2PvVB5T (last 
updated June 2016). 
46.  Jacobs, supra note 18. 
47.  Id. 
48.  Brad McElhinny, Lots of new WV laws go into effect this coming week, W. VA. 
METRONEWS (July 30, 2017, 4:31 PM), https://bit.ly/2OKe4eq. 
49. Jacobs, supra note 18. 
50.  See generally MICHAEL MEIT ET AL., APPALACHIAN REG’L COMM’N, 
APPALACHIAN DISEASES OF DESPAIR (Aug. 2017), http://bit.ly/2Qku6S3. 
51.  Id. at 1 (“Compared to the rest of the nation, the Appalachian Region faces 
disparities related to educational attainment, employment, income, and a number of health 
outcomes. . . . Socioeconomic factors, including education, employment, and income, are 
potential contributors to the growing opioid crisis in the United States.”). 
52.  Scott Cohn, In an economic death spiral: West Virginia is America’s worst state 
for business in 2017, CNBC (July 11, 2017, 4:44 PM), https://cnb.cx/2l9EnOF (“West 
Virginia has never done particularly well in our Top States rankings, but this year it hits 
bottom for the first time.”). 
53.  Id.  
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Virginia has struggled economically in large part due to decreased coal 
production.54 Coal production within the state in 2016 was about half of 
the level seen in 2008.55 
The drastic reduction in coal production is the result of the 
“[d]eclining use of coal by domestic power plants—linked to the 
coincident timing of low natural gas prices and stricter emissions 
standards—weak export demand and the backdrop of declining 
productivity from Southern West Virginia coal seams.”56 The decline of 
coal production has caused a decrease in jobs for rural communities, and 
the resulting increase in unemployment is a major factor contributing to 
the opioid problem in Appalachia.57 The issue involves not only the lack 
of coal jobs, but West Virginia’s undiversified reliance on coal, with 
community members struggling to find other work after the closure of 
mines.58 Accordingly, the coal decline has exacerbated the West Virginia 
opioid crisis because jobless West Virginians have resorted to opioids.59 
As Sean O’Leary and Ted Boettner of the West Virginia Center on 
Budget and Policy state: 
[N]atural resource extraction tends to lead to economic boom and bust 
cycles, as production grows and shrinks, energy prices rise and fall, 
and the resources themselves are depleted over time. West Virginia has 
experienced this pattern over the past century. Since the state is so 
dependent upon natural resources, this pattern of booms and busts 
causes volatility in revenue streams, leaving communities vulnerable, 
underdeveloped, and less economically secure.60 
This lack of economic security in West Virginia is a major factor leading 
to the rapid succession of the opioid crisis because the high unemployment 
levels have led to opioid abuse.61 
 
54.  Id. The substantial drop in coal production, which has been the driver of the West 
Virginia economy, is a key reason for the economic hardship the state has experienced. Id. 
55.  BRIAN LEGO & JOHN DESKINS, W. VA. UNIV. BUREAU OF BUS. & ECON. 
RESEARCH, COAL PRODUCTION IN WEST VIRGINIA: 2017–2040, at 1 (2017), 
http://busecon.wvu.edu/bber/pdfs/BBER-2017-08.pdf (“[S]ince 2008 the state’s overall 
coal mine output plunged by almost half from over 157 million to 80 million short tons in 
2016.”). 
56.  Id. at iv. 
57.  Tamarra Kemsley, Appalachia: The Cradle of the Opioid Epidemic, BLACK 
BEAR LODGE (Sept. 28, 2017), https://blackbearrehab.com/blog/appalachia-cradle-opioid-
epidemic/. 
58.  Jacobs, supra note 18.  
59.  Id.  
60.  SEAN O’LEARY & TED BOETTNER, W. VA. CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY, BOOMS 
AND BUSTS: THE IMPACT OF WEST VIRGINIA’S ENERGY ECONOMY 3 (July 2011), 
http://bit.ly/2SCWGdL. 
61.  MEIT ET AL., supra note 50, at 1; Jacobs, supra note 18.  
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In addition to its economic struggles, West Virginia also became a 
prime location for prescription pain medication because of the prevalence 
of labor-related injuries.62 The state has a significant number of workers 
in the timber, mining, and manufacturing fields, whose work injuries lead 
to opioid prescriptions.63 Mining camps in West Virginia, where doctors 
are likely to give patients a pain medication prescription instead of rest and 
time off work, have led to the prevalence of opioid addiction in these 
mining communities.64 
The flooding of opioids into West Virginia during the opioid crisis is 
exemplified by a study from the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention finding that, in 2012, West Virginians were prescribed 137.6 
opioid pain relievers per 100 people, among the highest in the country.65 
In addition, the state reported 15.7 long-acting or extended release opioid 
pain relievers per 100 people and 6.2 high-dose opioid pain relievers per 
100 people.66 Additionally, in 2015, West Virginia had the highest 
mortality rate due to drug overdose in the United States at 41.5 deaths per 
100,000 citizens.67 Despite efforts to monitor opioid prescriptions in West 
Virginia, the crisis has continued because individuals are now turning to 
other substances, such as heroin and fentanyl.68 
2. A Statewide War on Drugs: New Drug Penalties in West 
Virginia 
In December of 2016, West Virginia Senator Joe Manchin called for 
a new “War on Drugs” in West Virginia.69 Senator Manchin’s call for a 
War on Drugs would ultimately signal an eventful year to come in the 
Mountain State.70 For instance, in 2017, the West Virginia Legislature 
reacted to the state’s opioid crisis by passing drug laws that imposed heavy 
penalties aimed at cracking down on those consuming, selling, trafficking, 
 
62.  Jacobs, supra note 18. 
63.  Id. 
64.  See id. 
65.  Leonard J. Paulozzi et al., Vital Signs: Variation Among States in Prescribing 
Opioid Pain Relievers and Benzodiazepines — United States, 2012, 63 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 563, 564–66 (2014). 
66.  Id.  
67.  Drug Overdose Death Data, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 
16, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/statedeaths.html. The second highest 
rate was much lower, at 34.3 overdose deaths per 100,000 in New Hampshire, while the 
lowest rate was 6.9 overdose deaths per 100,000 in Nebraska. Id. 
68.  West Virginia distributing 8,000 opioid antidote kits in effort to stem overdoses, 
CBS NEWS (Feb. 6, 2017, 4:51 PM), https://cbsn.ws/2K5l0lO. 
69.  See Schleifer, supra note 5; see also infra Section II.C.1 for a discussion of the 
1980s War on Drugs. 
70.  See Schleifer, supra note 5. 
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or producing substances that have become increasingly common following 
the flood of opioids into West Virginia.71 House Speaker Tim Armstead 
stated that the new drug laws are aimed at “dealers who prey on our 
citizens.”72 
Senate Bill 219 gives birth to new felony conspiracy crimes.73 The 
new conspiracy crimes include a two to ten year determinate sentence74 
for those conspiring to manufacture or deliver Schedules I, II, III, or IV 
drugs and counterfeit substances.75 The Bill also creates three felonies for 
any person who “willfully conspires with one or more persons to 
manufacture, deliver, [or] possess with intent to manufacture or deliver” 
heroin, cocaine or cocaine base, PCP, LSD, and methamphetamine.76 The 
determinate sentences for the three additional felonies are: (1) two to thirty 
years; (2) two to twenty years; and (3) two to fifteen years.77 Interestingly, 
the new law also states that ownership of all drugs involved in the 
conspiracy may be attributed to all members.78 
Moreover, Senate Bill 220 creates two new drug crimes.79 The Bill 
creates a felony for delivering a controlled substance illicitly that, when 
used, ingested or consumed by itself or with other substances, causes 
death.80 This new felony is punishable by a determinate sentence of three 
 
71.  See McElhinny, supra note 48.  
72.  Lacie Pierson, WV House Focuses on Drug Crime Measures, HERALD DISPATCH 
(Mar. 6, 2017), https://bit.ly/2mfhOd1. These statements were made before the bills were 
signed into law. Id. 
73.  S.B. 219, 2017 Reg. Legis. Sess. (W. Va. 2017). 
74.  A determinate sentence is “definite and not subject to review by a parole board 
or other agency,” while an indeterminate sentence “has a minimum term but the release 
date, if any, [is] chosen by a parole board as it periodically reviews the case.” Determinate 
Sentence, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., http://bit.ly/2Ldl43v (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
75.  S.B. 219, 2017 Reg. Legis. Sess. (W. Va. 2017). The statute excludes those who 
conspire to manufacture or deliver marijuana. Id. Controlled substances are scheduled I 
through V in the West Virginia Code, and controls and penalties are assessed depending 
on a substance’s schedule. See W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 60A–2–201 to –213 (West 2018). 
For example, Schedule I substances are those deemed to have “high potential for abuse” 
and to have “no accepted medical use in treatment in the United States or lack[ing] accepted 
safety for use in treatment under medical supervision.” W. VA. CODE ANN. § 60A–2–203 
(West 2018). 
76.  S.B. 219, 2017 Reg. Legis. Sess. (W. Va. 2017). For cocaine and cocaine base 
under the new law, 5 kilograms triggers a 2- to 30-year sentence, 500 grams to 5 kilograms 
triggers a sentence of 2 to 20 years, while 2 grams to 10 grams triggers a sentence of 2 to 
15 years. Id. Additionally, for heroin, 1 kilogram triggers a sentence of 2 to 30 years, while 
100 grams to 1 kilogram triggers a sentence of 2 to 20 years, and 10 to 100 grams triggers 
a sentence of 2 to 15 years. Id. 
77.  Id.  
78.  Id.  
79.  S.B. 220, 2017 Reg. Legis. Sess. (W. Va. 2017) (amending W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 60-4-414 (West 2018)). 
80.  Id. 
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to fifteen years.81 In addition, the Bill creates a felony for knowingly 
failing to seek medical assistance for a person using a controlled substance 
if the person overdoses or has an adverse reaction leading to death.82 This 
felony would lead to an indeterminate sentence of one to five years.83 
Additionally, House Bill 2083 addresses the exposure of a minor to 
the manufacture of methamphetamine, increasing the sentencing for such 
an act.84 The sentencing is increased from one to five years to two to ten 
years, with an unchanged fine of up to $10,000.85 A new felony is also 
created for those who expose children to the manufacture of 
methamphetamine who suffer serious bodily injury while at the location, 
with a three to fifteen year penalty, as well as a potential fine of up to 
$25,000.86 
Further, House Bill 2329 addresses fentanyl, analogs, or 
derivatives.87 The Bill gives birth to a felony for the manufacture, delivery, 
transport, or possession of fentanyl, by itself or mixed with other 
controlled substances.88 Manufacture, delivery, transport, or possession of 
less than one gram results in a sentence of two to ten years, one to five 
grams results in a sentence of three to fifteen years, and five grams or more 
results in a sentence of four to twenty years.89 
In addition, House Bill 2579 addresses the transportation of narcotics 
and other controlled substances into the state, increasing the penalties for 
such an act.90 Interestingly, the Bill also applies to individuals who “cause 
[controlled substances] to be transported.”91 The penalty for transporting 
Schedule I or II narcotics remains unchanged at one to fifteen years 
imprisonment with a possible fine of up to $25,000.92 The one to five year 
penalty for transportation of other Schedule I, II, or III substances 
increased to one to ten years imprisonment, with a possible fine of 
$15,000.93 The penalty for marijuana is one to five years, with a possible 
fine of $10,000 or less, and transporting a Schedule IV drug increased 
from one to three years to one to five years, with a possible fine that 
 
81.  Id. 
82.  Id. 
83.  Id. 
84.  H.B. 2083, 2017 Reg. Legis. Sess. (W. Va. 2017). 
85.  Id. 
86.  Id. 
87.  H.B. 2329, 2017 Reg. Legis. Sess. (W. Va. 2017). 
88.  Id. 
89.  Id. 
90.  H.B. 2579, 2017 Reg. Legis. Sess. (W. Va. 2017). 
91.  Id. (emphasis added).  
92.  Id. 
93.  Id. 
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remains unchanged at $10,000.94 The Bill also increases penalties for the 
transportation of certain substances.95 The substances include heroin, 
cocaine or cocaine base, PCP, LSD, and methamphetamine.96 The 
sentences are, depending on the quantity transported, two to thirty years, 
two to twenty years, or two to fifteen years.97 
West Virginia’s politicians reacted to the state’s opioid crisis by 
announcing a “War on Drugs” in December 2016.98 As a result, the West 
Virginia Legislature passed a series of harsh laws aimed at combating the 
drug problem.99 Whether these laws will adequately fight the opioid crisis 
or create even more problems down the road remains to be seen. However, 
looking at past prosecution of drug-related offenses is helpful in predicting 
the success of the new drug laws. 
C. The 1980s Expansion of the War on Drugs: Mandatory 
Minimums and the Attack on Crack-Cocaine 
The new drug penalties in West Virginia resemble the approach taken 
in the 1980s as part of that decade’s War on Drugs.100 The harsh approach 
of the 1980s came about as a result of increased political attention towards 
drugs and the public hysteria surrounding crack–cocaine.101 
1. The Nixon Era War on Drugs 
The United States has a history of strict drug policies, which enjoyed 
popularity in the 1970s following President Richard Nixon’s 1969 
initiation of the American “War on Drugs.”102 This initiative, along with 
other actions, led to the passage of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act of 1970.103 Title II, called the Controlled 
 
94.  Id. 
95.  Id. 
96.  Id. 
97.  Id. For cocaine or cocaine base, transporting 5 kilograms or more triggers a 
sentence of 2 to 30 years, 500 grams to 5 kilograms triggers a sentence of 2 to 20 years, 
and 50 to 500 grams triggers a sentence of 2 to 15 years. Id. For heroin, transporting 1 
kilogram or more triggers a sentence of 2 to 30 years, 100 grams to 1 kilogram triggers a 
sentence of 2 to 20 years, and 10 to 100 grams triggers a sentence of 2 to 15 years. Id. 
98.  Schleifer, supra note 5.  
99.  McElhinny, supra note 48.  
100. See VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 8, at 1–2 (describing the 1980s crack-
cocaine hysteria and the changes to federal prison sentencing that occurred as a result). 
101. Id. 
102. Spencer A. Stone, Federal Drug Sentencing-What Was Congress Smoking? The 
Uncertain Distinction Between “Cocaine” and “Cocaine Base” in the Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1986, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 297, 309 (2007). 
103. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 
91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970); Stone, supra note 102, at 310. 
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Substances Act, created the five drug schedules that are currently 
employed today.104 The Controlled Substances Act also created 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(a)—a statute that made it unlawful to “manufacture, distribute, or 
dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a 
controlled substance.”105 
2. The 1980s: Mandatory Minimums and the Crack-Cocaine 
Hysteria 
With the election of President Reagan in 1980, the following decade 
saw an increase in anti-drug policies compared to the decade before.106 In 
1982, for example, President Reagan doubled down on President Nixon’s 
War on Drugs and declared that “[d]rugs are bad, and we’re going after 
them. As I’ve said before, we’ve taken down the surrender flag and run up 
the battle flag. And we’re going to win the war on drugs.”107 West Virginia 
Senator Joe Manchin’s rhetoric at the end of 2016 was strikingly similar.108 
In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act with the goal 
of limiting inequality in federal sentencing.109 The Sentencing Reform Act 
sought to limit the sentencing disparities among defendants who 
committed the same types of crime.110 After Congress passed the 
Sentencing Reform Act, numerous new mandatory minimum penalties 
came into existence from 1984 to 1990.111 Many of the mandatory 
minimum penalties that were created targeted drug-related and violent 
crimes.112 
With these policies in place, the 1980s crack-cocaine hysteria took 
off, in large part due to media coverage.113 In 1985, the New York Times 
produced an article in which it became the first major news entity to use 
the term “crack–cocaine,” and published a front page follow-up two weeks 
 
104. Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); Stone, supra note 102, at 310. 
105. Stone, supra note 102, at 310 (discussing 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2012 & Supp. 
2017)). 
106.  Id. 
107.  Ronald Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation on Federal Drug Policy, RONALD 
REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY & MUSEUM (Oct. 2, 1982), http://bit.ly/2RNMGhO; see 
also Stone, supra note 102, at 310. 
108.  See Schleifer, supra note 5 (quoting Sen. Manchin as stating, “[w]e need to 
declare a war on drugs . . . . It’s just been unbelievable”). 
109.  See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984); 
see also VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 8, at 1. 
110.  See Sentencing Reform Act; see also VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 8, at 1.  
111.  See VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 8, at 1. 
112.  See id. 
113.  See Alyssa L. Beaver, Getting A Fix on Cocaine Sentencing Policy: Reforming 
the Sentencing Scheme of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2531, 
2539 (2010). 
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later describing the risks and addictive qualities of crack–cocaine.114 In 
1986, explosive articles from the New York Times, Newsweek, and other 
news outlets were published that portrayed a crack–cocaine epidemic in 
the United States.115 
Possibly most inflammatory was the high-profile death of Len Bias 
(“Bias”), a former University of Maryland basketball star, who overdosed 
soon after being drafted by the Boston Celtics.116 Rumors spread that Bias 
died due to smoking crack–cocaine; however, Bias had actually snorted 
powder cocaine.117 Despite the inaccuracy in reporting that Bias had died 
from smoking crack–cocaine, Bias’s death amplified the media frenzy 
surrounding crack–cocaine.118 
At that time, media reports about a “crack baby” crisis also flooded 
the public.119 Crack baby anecdotes fueled the anti-crack–cocaine 
movement, despite the fact that the “crack baby syndrome” has now been 
largely disproven.120 The media’s largely inaccurate and frenzied 
depiction of the crack–cocaine crisis influenced the public to view crack–
cocaine as far more dangerous than its powder cocaine counterpart.121 
The public hysteria surrounding crack-cocaine led to swift 
governmental action.122 At the state level, new mandatory minimum 
sentences were employed, statutory maximums were increased, and in 
certain jurisdictions, a mandatory sentence of life without parole was 
employed for crack–cocaine offenses.123 Perhaps the most famous 
reaction, however, was Congress’s passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1986.124 
 
114.  See id.  
115.  See Deborah Ahrens, Methademic: Drug Panic in an Age of Ambivalence, 37 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 841, 853 (2010). 
116.  See Beaver, supra note 113, at 2539. 
117.  John Schuppe, 30 Years after Basketball Star Len Bias’ Death, Its Drug War 
Impact Endures, NBC NEWS (June 19, 2016, 8:37 AM), https://nbcnews.to/2QDzmfq. 
118.  See Beaver, supra note 113, at 2539. 
119.  See Ahrens, supra note 115, at 854–55 (“Crack cocaine . . . produced headlines 
and prosecutions related to an alleged ‘crack baby’ epidemic, where, per the media and 
other sources, crack cocaine caused large numbers of infants to suffer severe, irreversible 
health problems resulting from maternal use of crack cocaine.”). 
120.  See id. 
121.  See id. at 856 (“[M]any of the health problems found with babies born to 
mothers who had used crack were attributable to lack of prenatal care, poor nutrition and 
personal care, and co-existing substance use such as tobacco and alcohol.”). 
122.  See id. 
123.  See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7403(2)(a)(i) (West 2018) (calling for 
a mandatory life sentence for individuals with certain quantities of Schedule I and II 
narcotic drugs); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 601 U.S. 957, 957–58 (1991) (upholding 
the Michigan law’s constitutionality, which led to a life sentence for possession of over 
650 grams of cocaine). 
124.  Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). 
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The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986¾drafted, debated, and passed in 
just over a month¾imposed new mandatory minimum sentences.125 
Famously, the Act put in place the one-hundred-to-one (“100:1”) policy, 
which required every one gram of crack–cocaine to be sentenced the same 
as one-hundred grams of powder cocaine.126 For example, crimes 
involving just five grams of crack–cocaine would be sentenced the same 
as crimes involving 500 grams of powder cocaine.127 Crimes involving 
500 grams of powder cocaine or five grams of crack–cocaine each were to 
receive sentences of five or more years.128 Those convicted of crimes 
involving 5,000 grams of powder cocaine, and 50 grams of crack–cocaine, 
were to receive ten-year sentences.129 
More recently, the opioid crisis has devastated the United States, but 
no state has been affected more than West Virginia.130 Similar to the 1980s 
crack–cocaine hysteria and War on Drugs, West Virginia is currently in a 
state of panic, with politicians calling for a newfound War on Drugs.131 In 
response to the opioid crisis, the West Virginia Legislature passed a series 
of harsh laws increasing mandatory minimum sentences and creating new 
drug crimes.132 These new laws are similar to the harsh drug laws that 
came about in the 1980s.133 Therefore, the outcomes associated with the 
1980s drug laws suggest that the new West Virginia drug laws could do 
considerable damage.134 
Therefore, West Virginia should take alternative routes to combat the 
opioid crisis. First, the state should invest more heavily in its drug court 
program, focusing on rehabilitation instead of incarceration.135 In addition, 
 
125.  Beaver, supra note 113, at 2454. 
126.  VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 8, at 1–2. 
127.   Id. at 2. 
128.   Id.  
129.   Id.  
130.   See Jacobs, supra note 18. 
131.   See Schleifer, supra note 5. However, the War on Drugs, which began under 
President Nixon, has been largely viewed as a failure. Id. 
132.   See legislation cited supra note 6; see also McElhinny, supra note 48; Pierson, 
supra note 72. 
133.   See legislation cited supra note 6; see generally VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra 
note 8 (outlining the negative effects of the 1980s crackdown on drugs, mandatory 
minimum sentences, and the crack-cocaine hysteria). 
134.   See generally Angela J. Davis, The Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to End Mass 
Incarceration, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063 (2016) (calling for an end to mass incarceration 
and analyzing the negative effects of mandatory minimum sentences); see also VAGINS & 
MCCURDY, supra note 8, at 1–2 (discussing negative outcomes resulting from 1980s drug 
policy). 
135.   See generally RYAN S. KING & JILL PASQUARELLA, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, 
DRUG COURTS: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE (2009), https://bit.ly/2PTxD8M (discussing the 
history and positive results of drug courts in the United States); see also LUKE YINGLING, 
W. VA. CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY, A LOOK AT DRUG COURTS IN WEST VIRGINIA (2017), 
 574 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 123:2 
the state must stimulate and diversify its struggling economy and put West 
Virginians back to work.136 Only when these measures have been taken 
will West Virginians begin to see a recession of the state’s current opioid 
crisis.137 
III. ANALYSIS 
The new drug laws in West Virginia largely mirror the 1980s 
mandatory minimum sentences.138 As with the laws passed in the 1980s 
aimed at fighting the perceived crack–cocaine crisis, the new West 
Virginia drug laws aim to fight the opioid crisis by creating new felonies 
and increasing mandatory minimum sentences.139 The outcomes 
associated with the 1980s drug policy therefore must be analyzed in 
assessing whether West Virginia’s new laws will be successful. 
Ultimately, this Comment concludes that the new laws will do damage, 
and West Virginia should instead bolster its drug courts, while also 
improving the economy and putting West Virginians back to work.140 
 
A. Analyzing the 1980s Crackdown: Did Mandatory Minimums 
Work? 
Researchers have consistently found that the drug-sentencing policies 
of the 1980s led to negative systemic outcomes.141 For example, the harsh 
 
https://bit.ly/2Prg9Bi (discussing the positive effects of drug courts in West Virginia, as 
compared to traditional prison sentencing models). 
136.   Jacobs, supra note 18 (noting that unemployment is one of the key causes of 
the West Virginia opioid crisis); see also Cohn, supra note 52 (discussing West Virginia’s 
struggling economy, which is currently among the worst in the United States). Initiatives 
like ScaleUp West Virginia are seeking to diversify West Virginia’s stagnant economy by 
providing support to entrepreneurs and small businesses. John Dahlia, TechConnect’s 
ScaleUp Boosts Economy, One Innovation at a Time, EXPONENT TELEGRAM (Mar. 6, 2017), 
https://bit.ly/2OKr83D. 
137.   Jacobs, supra note 18; Cohn, supra note 52; Dahlia, supra note 136; YINGLING, 
supra note 135.  
138.   See legislation cited supra note 6. 
139.   See legislation cited supra note 6. 
140.   See VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 8, at 1–2 (discussing negative outcomes 
associated with 1980s drug policy); YINGLING, supra note 135 (analyzing the positive 
effects drug courts have had in West Virginia, and the need to increase access to drug courts 
throughout the state); Jacobs, supra note 18 (discussing the negative economic climate in 
West Virginia, and its effects on the opioid crisis in the state); Dahlia, supra note 136 
(highlighting ScaleUp West Virginia, an initiative that helps support innovative 
entrepreneurs and small businesses in West Virginia).  
141.   See Davis, supra note 134, at 1063 (calling for an end to American mass 
incarceration and analyzing the negative effects of mandatory minimum sentences); 
VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 8, at 1–2 (discussing the negative effects of the 1980s 
drug laws, especially on African-Americans and women). 
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sentencing laws of the 1980s led to American mass incarceration.142 The 
impact of the 1980s drug laws on the American prison population is 
astonishing, as the prison population has increased approximately 800% 
since 1980.143 Crack-cocaine laws, where even first-time offenders with 
small amounts received a five-year sentence, largely contributed to this 
problem.144 
In the United States today, 2.3 million people are incarcerated in state 
or federal prisons, and almost half a million people are incarcerated for 
drug-related offenses.145 These numbers are not the worldwide norm.146 
The United States has, by far, the highest prison population in the world.147 
In fact, studies show that the United States imprisons almost 25% of the 
world’s prison population.148 
In addition to causing mass incarceration, the 1980s drug laws also 
brought about considerable racial discrepancies.149 Critics have gone as far 
as calling the War on Drugs “a war on African-Americans.”150 The 100:1 
policy for crack–cocaine has disproportionately affected the African-
American community.151 For example, data show that African-Americans 
make up 15% of American drug users, yet account for 74% of those 
 
142.   See Davis, supra note 134, at 1065–70 (stating that the harsh mandatory 
minimum sentences of the 1980s led to mass incarceration in the United States); see also 
Matthew C. Lamb, A Return to Rehabilitation: Mandatory Minimum Sentencing in an Era 
of Mass Incarceration, 41 J. LEGIS. 126, 127–28 (2015) (“Fortunately, no one seriously 
debates the damaging effects associated with the penal policy of the War on Drugs. After 
the proliferation of these policies, most notably mandatory minimum sentences, the prison 
population skyrocketed.”). 
143.   Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Get a Little Less Tough on Crime, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (May 9, 2014, 1:00 PM), https://bit.ly/2rmIgkx. Meanwhile, the American 
population as a whole has increased by only a third. Id. 
144.   Id. 
145.   Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2017, 
PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (Mar. 14, 2017), http://bit.ly/2EktKV7.  
146.   See Highest to Lowest, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, https://bit.ly/2RTsSJt (last visited 
Dec. 9, 2018) (providing country-by-country statistics regarding the worldwide prison 
population). This study reports that Brazil has the second highest prison population, with 
less than 700,000 total inmates. Id. This number is less than one third of the United States 
prison population. Id. 
147.   See id. 
148.   Mass Incarceration, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION, https://www.aclu.org/issues/smart-justice/mass-incarceration (last visited Dec. 9, 
2018) [hereinafter ACLU, Mass Incarceration]. 
149.   See generally VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 8 (criticizing mandatory 
minimum sentences, the 100:1 policy, and noting the effects of such policies on the 
African-American community). 
150.   See Ahrens, supra note 115, at 858.  
151.   See VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 8, at i. 
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imprisoned for drug offenses.152 Additionally, in 1986, before the passage 
of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, average drug sentences for African-
Americans were 11% higher than those for Caucasians; however, just four 
years later, that same number rose to 49%.153 
The mass incarceration and racial discrepancies experienced 
nationwide as a result of stricter drug laws provide a cautionary tale for 
West Virginia.154 West Virginia is less diverse than the United States as a 
whole, but harsh penalties could lead to negative discrepancies for 
minorities and those of a lower socioeconomic status. 
The 1980s drug laws, like the West Virginia drug laws, were passed 
with the aim of bringing down heavily involved drug traffickers and 
dealers.155 However, the 1980s penalties led to minor offenders serving 
long sentences.156 Data show that “73% of crack defendants have only 
low-level involvement in drug activity, such as street-level dealers, 
couriers, or lookouts.”157 According to the Pew Research Center, prisoners 
sentenced for minor roles make up the largest share of federal drug 
offenders.158 These statistics are concerning for West Virginia, where 
lawmakers claim the new penalties will attack out-of-state, large scale 
trafficking.159 The West Virginia laws, similar to those of the 1980s, could 
lead to low-level dealers and users being incarcerated for long periods of 
time.160 
 
152.   Id. (“African Americans make up 15% of the country’s drug users, yet they 
comprise 37% of those arrested for drug violations, 59% of those convicted, and 74% of 
those sentenced to prison for a drug offense.”). 
153.   Id. at ii. 
154.   See id.; see also Lamb, supra note 142, at 128 (“Through its steadfast 
commitment to the mandatory-minimum model, the War on Drugs inflicted steep fiscal 
and social costs on the American population.”). 
155.   See Federal Drug Sentencing Laws Bring High Cost, Low Return, PEW 
CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Aug. 27, 2015), https://bit.ly/1WUBHky; see also Pierson, supra 
note 72 (discussing the West Virginia Legislature’s goals of cracking down on drug dealers 
with the new drug laws); Linda Harris, New Laws for Stiffer Penalties, Centralized 
Reporting Aimed at Addiction Epidemic, STATE JOURNAL (June 26, 2017), 
http://bit.ly/2L7nFfh (highlighting the new drug conspiracy penalties, aimed at stopping 
Detroit dealers from bringing illicit drugs into West Virginia). 
156.   PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 155 (“Federal sentencing laws that were 
designed with serious traffickers in mind have resulted in lengthy imprisonment of 
offenders who played relatively minor roles.”). 
157.   VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 8, at ii. 
158.   See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 155. 
159.   See Harris, supra note 155; see also Pierson, supra note 72 (discussing the West 
Virginia Legislature’s goals of cracking down on drug dealers with the new 2017 drug 
laws). 
160.   See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 155.  
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Finally, the 1980s mandatory minimum sentences did little to curtail 
drug use in the United States.161 Recidivism rates in the United States are 
high.162 Close to a third of drug offenders who leave federal prison commit 
crimes again, or violate conditions of their release.163 This statistic has not 
changed significantly in decades.164 Research shows that increased 
sentences do not lower recidivism rates, and that decreased sentences do 
not lead to increased rates of recidivism.165 Increased incarceration rates 
have also led to a surge in federal prison spending, while state prison 
spending has also risen dramatically.166 
In addition, overall access to illegal drugs has not significantly 
changed as a result of increased sentencing.167 In fact, drug prices have 
declined and drug use has increased.168 The trend of decreased prices and 
increased demand shows that the 1980s drug laws failed to limit the supply 
or demand of illicit drugs.169 
The 1980s drug statutes were clearly unsuccessful in achieving the 
goals of fighting the drug trade and ultimately caused considerable 
systemic problems.170 West Virginia should reconsider adopting outdated 
policies that have caused so many negative outcomes.171 The new drug 
laws in West Virginia have similar goals to those of the 1980s and 
prescribe similar measures to reach these goals.172 Unfortunately, the 
 
161.   See id.  
162.   See id. 
163.   See id. 
164.   See id. 
165.   Id. (“[Mandatory minimums] have failed to reduce recidivism.”). 
166.   See id. (stating that 1980 federal prison spending increased from $970 million 
to over $6.7 billion in inflation-adjusted dollars from 1980 to 2013); see also STEPHANIE 
STULLICH ET AL., U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., STATE AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES ON CORRECTION 
AND EDUCATION 1 (2016), http://bit.ly/2G7vHFP (“From 1979–80 to 2012–13, public PK–
12 expenditures increased by 107 percent (from $258 to $534 billion), while total state and 
local corrections expenditures increased by 324 percent (from $17 to $71 billion)—triple 
the rate of increase in education spending.”). 
167.   See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 155. 
168.   See id. (“[T]he estimated retail prices of cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine 
all decreased from 1981 to 2012, even as the purity of the drugs increased . . . . [Also,] [t]he 
share of Americans age 12 and older who said in a national survey that they had used an 
illicit drug during the previous month increased from 6.7 percent in 1990 to 9.2 percent—
or nearly 24 million people—in 2012.”). 
169.   See id.  
170.   See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 155; VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra 
note 8, at 1–2; ACLU, Mass Incarceration, supra note 148; Wagner & Rabuy, supra note 
145.  
171.   See legislation cited supra note 6; see also PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra 
note 155 (presenting many of the failures of the 1980s drug policy).  
172.   Compare Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–570, 100 Stat. 3207 
(1986), with legislation cited supra note 6. See generally VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 
8 (describing the nature of the 1980s mandatory minimum sentences and drug policy); 
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current economic situation in West Virginia suggests that severe drug laws 
could lead to similarly damaging results. 
B. A Viable Alternative to Increased Mandatory Minimums: 
Increased Investment in Drug Courts 
West Virginia should invest more in its drug court program, as 
opposed to adopting outdated and harsh drug laws. Drug courts, an 
alternative to traditional sentencing models, have achieved many positive 
results that would benefit West Virginia.173 While there are over 3,000 
drug courts in the United States, West Virginia has adult drug courts 
serving only 46 of 55 counties, and juvenile drug courts serving only 23 
of 55 counties.174 
Drug courts were created to respond to the poor outcomes associated 
with traditional criminal sentencing.175 This alternative system is focused 
on “treating offenders with a history of drug abuse for their addiction, 
while simultaneously ensuring supervision, and sanctions when needed, 
from the courts.”176 The drug court framework includes screening and 
assessment, judicial interaction, monitoring and supervision, sanctions and 
incentives, and treatment and rehabilitation services.177 The broad goal of 
drug court programs is to decrease drug demand by limiting recidivism 
and encouraging treatment.178 These programs incorporate considerable 
judicial discretion and frequent interaction between the offender and the 
judge.179 
 
Harris, supra note 155 (discussing the new laws’ aims to curb traffickers and dealers); 
Pierson, supra note 72 (providing quotes regarding the West Virginia Legislature’s goal of 
curbing dealers).  
173.   See KING & PASQUARELLA, supra note 135, at 19; see also David Festinger & 
Karen Leggett-Dugosh, Commentary: Drug Courts’ Positive Effects on Families and 
Society, PARTNERSHIP FOR DRUG-FREE KIDS (May 17, 2013), https://bit.ly/2QFYiDb 
(discussing the positive effects of drug courts on society and on families in particular). 
174.   See Adult Drug Courts, W. VA. JUDICIARY [hereinafter W. Va. Adult Drug 
Courts], https://bit.ly/2qSL5vD (last visited Dec. 9, 2018); see also Juvenile Drug Courts, 
W. VA. JUDICIARY [hereinafter W. Va. Juvenile Drug Courts], https://bit.ly/2DkKLNt (last 
visited Dec. 9, 2018); Drug Courts, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, https://bit.ly/2pGAvta (last 
updated Aug. 23, 2018) (reporting that in the United States, as of 2015, there were 1,558 
adult drug courts, and 3,142 total drug courts). While numbers may have increased overall, 
a 2017 study found that West Virginia had only 31 drug courts serving 46 counties. 
YINGLING, supra note 135. 
175.   See KING & PASQUARELLA, supra note 135, at 1. 
176.   Id. 
177.   See generally NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 174. 
178.   See KING & PASQUARELLA, supra note 135, at 1. 
179.   See id. at 4, 12.  
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There are numerous benefits associated with drug courts, including 
decreased recidivism rates.180 One study of seventy-six drug courts noted 
a 10% decrease in rearrest.181 In addition, six New York drug courts 
experienced a 29% reduction in rearrest over the three years following the 
offenders’ original arrest.182 In addition to decreased recidivism rates, drug 
courts save money.183 The average annual cost of incarceration is about 
$23,000 per person, while the average annual cost of drug court is about 
$4,300 per person.184 These numbers only reflect the direct cost savings, 
and not overall savings associated with lower recidivism rates. 
In 2005, West Virginia followed the national trend and opened its 
first drug court in the Northern Panhandle.185 Since 2005, drug courts have 
sprouted up around the state.186 Presently, forty-six of West Virginia’s 
fifty-five counties have adult drug courts, while only twenty-three counties 
have juvenile drug courts.187 As of January 2017, thirty-one total drug 
courts served forty-six counties in the state.188 The slim number of juvenile 
drug courts in West Virginia is alarming because each day 7,000 West 
Virginia juveniles are under court-ordered supervision.189 In addition, 
“[a]nnual West Virginia juvenile probation reports demonstrate that 
controlled substance violations are the third largest category of offenses 
charged.”190 
 
The cost savings West Virginia has experienced as a result of drug 
courts has been considerable.191 Data released in 2013 reflect the following 
with regard to West Virginia: 
[A] year stint in prison cost[s] $24,000, the same period of time in jail 
cost[s] $18,250, and a year in drug court cost[s] $7,100. Considering 
the cost of jail as of 2013, if the 1,002 [West Virginia] drug court 
 
180.   See id. at 5–9.  
181.   Id. at 5 (citing Deborah K. Shaffer, Looking Inside the Black Box of Drug 
Courts: A Meta-Analytic Review, 28 JUST. Q. 493 (2011)). 
182.   Id. at 6 (citing MICHAEL REMPEL ET AL., CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, THE NEW 
YORK STATE ADULT DRUG COURT EVALUATION: POLICIES, PARTICIPANTS, AND IMPACTS 
(2003)).  
183.   See YINGLING, supra note 135.  
184.   See KING & PASQUARELLA, supra note 135, at 8. 
185.   See YINGLING, supra note 135. 
186.   See id.  
187.   W. Va. Adult Drug Courts, supra note 174; see also W. Va. Juvenile Drug 
Courts, supra note 174.  
188.   See YINGLING, supra note 135. 
189.   W. Va. Juvenile Drug Courts, supra note 174; see also NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, 
supra note 174 (reporting that, as of 2015, there were 409 juvenile drug courts in the United 
States). 
190.   Id.  
191.   See YINGLING, supra note 135. 
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graduates had served a year sentence in jail rather than an equal term 
in drug court, the cost savings would total more than $11 million.192 
Additionally, drug courts have improved the state’s issue with 
recidivism.193 According to former West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals Justice Brent Benjamin, data show that just 9% of adults and 14% 
of minors who graduate the drug court program recidivate.194 When 
compared to the federal prison recidivism rates of almost one third, the 
positive impact drug court programs have had in West Virginia is clear.195 
Despite the positive effects of drug courts in West Virginia, many 
issues exist that must be addressed.196 First, nine of the state’s fifty-five 
counties do not currently have an adult drug court.197 In addition, juvenile 
drug courts serve only twenty-three counties.198 Ensuring that all fifty-five 
counties have a drug court for adults and minors is the first step in 
continuing the fight against opioid addiction. 
In addition, West Virginia needs to increase overall funding for its 
drug courts.199 West Virginia is ground zero for opioid addiction and 
deserves a drug court system that can adequately reach its people.200 The 
U.S. Department of Justice awarded West Virginia a 1.4 million dollar 
grant to support its drug courts and Veterans Treatment Courts.201 This 
grant is encouraging, but additional funding is necessary to cover a state 
that is in desperate need of solutions. 
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200.   See id.; see also Jacobs, supra note 18 (discussing West Virginia’s grim 
struggles with the opioid crisis); Kemsley, supra note 57 (analyzing the opioid crisis in 
Appalachia, and some causes, including unemployment, work-related injuries, and low 
education levels); Paulozzi et al., supra note 65, at 564–66 (providing data showing that 
West Virginia has been flooded with opioids). 
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individual federal award to support drug court programs, W. Va. METRONEWS (Sept. 22, 
2017, 5:17 PM), https://bit.ly/2FnrJZD. 
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In light of the positive trends associated with drug courts, the West 
Virginia Legislature should increase the West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals’ funding for drug court programs.202 West Virginia needs a drug 
court system that is adequately funded and present in all fifty-five counties 
for adults and juveniles.203 Giving more West Virginians access to drug 
courts would greatly aid the state’s fight against the opioid crisis. 
C. West Virginia Must Stimulate Its Economy and Put People 
Back to Work to Reduce the Opioid Problem 
As mentioned above, West Virginia’s economy has suffered greatly, 
and West Virginia’s employment rate is currently ranked forty-first out of 
fifty states.204 In 2012, the National Survey on Drug Use and Health found 
a link between unemployment and substance abuse.205 The study 
discovered that one in six unemployed individuals has a substance abuse 
problem, almost double the rate of working individuals.206 A separate 
study also suggests that lack of employment likely contributes to substance 
abuse.207 
West Virginia can start to fight the opioid problem by diversifying its 
economy and breaking away from its reliance on coal.208 Investment in 
innovative businesses is one solution to this issue. ScaleUp West Virginia, 
launched in 2015, exemplifies such a solution.209 ScaleUp West Virginia 
provides assistance and support to entrepreneurs in the Mountain State.210 
This small operation received $500,000 from the United States Economic 
 
202.   See supra Section III.B for a discussion of the positive trends associated with 
drug courts. 
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https://bit.ly/1cq703N.  
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209.   See Dahlia, supra note 136. 
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Development Administration, and West Virginia added $210,000 in 
funding.211 
ScaleUp West Virginia is stimulating business “through programs 
designed to encourage entrepreneurship, help startups find the assistance 
needed to successfully launch, and support existing businesses in devising 
strategies for growing and adapting to new markets.”212 In March 2017, 
Executive Director Ann Barth stated that ScaleUp West Virginia has 
already created or retained forty jobs, and helped create twelve new 
companies.213 
This program alone is not enough, but it is one example of how the 
state and federal government have recognized the need to create 
innovative new businesses in West Virginia.214 Initiatives like ScaleUp 
West Virginia, but on a larger scale, could assuage the opioid crisis by 
putting West Virginians back to work. 
In addition, communities are slowly implementing retraining 
programs to help former miners find employment during the modern 
energy transition.215 One study, conducted in rural West Virginia, found 
that former miners have become receptive to retraining to become 
electricity linemen, solar installers, wind installers, truck drivers, tourism 
employees, and construction workers.216 Although this movement is 
encouraging, former miners often are required to travel long distances and 
spend time away from home in order to seek these opportunities.217 More 
work must be done to provide mining communities with retraining and 
employment opportunities close to home.218 Providing former miners with 
meaningful career opportunities close to home will help fight West 
Virginia’s opioid crisis.219 
D. Recommendation 
West Virginia should repeal its attempt to combat the opioid crisis 
through strict drug laws.220 These harsh laws will likely produce the same 
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systemic problems that arose as a result of the nation’s 1980s attempt to 
combat crack-cocaine.221 Instead, West Virginia should focus on 
bolstering its drug court program.222 Currently, nine counties are not 
served by an adult drug court, and thirty-two counties are not served by a 
juvenile drug court.223 However, drug courts are more cost-effective than 
incarceration and deter recidivism.224 In addition, West Virginia needs to 
diversify its economy to decrease reliance on coal extraction.225 
Diversifying the struggling economy and putting West Virginians back to 
work is necessary to fight the vicious opioid crisis.226 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The United States has been overwhelmed by the modern opioid crisis, 
which was created by shifting views of pain management and aggressive 
marketing of prescription pain medication in the 1990s.227 However, no 
state has been affected by opioids more than West Virginia.228 The 
Mountain State’s unemployment, labor-related injuries, and poor 
educational outcomes have made it especially vulnerable to the crisis.229 
In response, the West Virginia Legislature passed a series of harsh drug 
laws in 2017 aimed at combating the opioid crisis.230 These laws created 
new drug felonies and increased mandatory minimum sentences.231 
Unfortunately, these laws will likely lead to more problems for West 
Virginia.232 The 1980s War on Drugs saw similar laws passed in an effort 
to fight illicit drugs, particularly crack-cocaine.233 However, these harsh 
laws led to mass incarceration, racial discrepancies, and the incarceration 
of small-time offenders.234 In addition, illicit drug prices have dropped and 
illicit drug demand has risen since the 1980s laws went into effect.235 
These results suggest that harsh drug penalties and mandatory minimum 
sentences are not the answer for West Virginia.236 
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Instead, the Mountain State should invest more heavily in its drug 
court program.237 Drug courts, with their rehabilitative focus, are cost-
effective and lead to lower recidivism rates.238 Unfortunately, nine 
counties currently have no adult drug courts, and thirty-two counties 
currently have no juvenile drug court.239 Increased access to drug courts in 
West Virginia is essential.240 In addition, the state must diversify and 
stimulate its coal-reliant economy.241 Putting West Virginians back to 
work will help the state fight the opioid crisis.242 
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